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BEYOND CURRICULUM: GROUNDWORK FOR A NON-INSTRUMENTAL THEORY 
OF EDUCATION 
Deborah Osberg & Gert Biesta 
 
Abstract: 
This paper problematizes current thinking about education by arguing that the question of 
educational purpose is not simply a socio-political question concerned with what the ends 
should be and why, but can also be understood as a structural question, concerned with the 
way we understand education’s directional impetus. We suggest that it is possible to 
understand education as something other than a curricular instrument designed to facilitate 
a purpose external to itself. We challenge such an instrumental view by arguing that education 
is an emergent phenomenon with its own unique aesthetic qualities (like art or music); a 
phenomenon, moreover, that does not simply serve a purpose, but generates the purpose it 
serves. In this paper we lay down the groundwork for such a non-instrumental understanding 
of education by combining the notion of emergence with ideas from Cassirer’s Philosophy of 
Symbolic Forms, Aristotle’s teleological notion of the ‘ideal’ as self-generated and the Greek 
notion of ‘paideia.’ This provides an opportunity to theorise education’s directional impetus 
as the ongoing and open-ended coordination of three realms of human life: the symbolic, the 
individual and the political. Given the acute political and social dilemmas that instrumental 
understandings of education bring forth in multicultural, and so called ‘democratic’ and 
‘inclusive’  societies, we hope that by opening the possibility to theorise education as a non-
instrumental phenomenon, it may become possible to have more fruitful discussion regarding 




Aristotle, affect, Cassirer, educational purpose, emergence 
 
Introduction 
The idea and practice of education, tied as it is to socio-historical moments shaped by a wider 
history, has in our time, fallen into a form of disrepair, or perhaps one could even say despair. 
We believe it has literally ‘fallen apart’ in that there is no longer any consensus as to what 
education actually is or which normative role it should serve. Education, in other words, is no 
longer a coherent entity or practice, but has been largely reduced to being an instrument for 
external aims and purposes. This form of dis(re)pair is not, therefore, due to abandonment or 
inattention (although it could be argued that the concept of education has been abandoned in 
favour of concepts such as teaching, learning and curriculum). Indeed, the practices and 
purposes of ‘education’ (actually teaching, learning and curriculum) continue to receive a very 
great deal of attention from many quarters. On the one hand education has received 
significant attention from those who seek to narrow its focus towards the production of a 
particular set of measurable learning outcomes.’ On the other hand education has received 
significant attention from those who seek to broaden its focus, for example by seeing 
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education as a basic human right, as can, for example, be seen in UNESCO’s positioning of 
education at the heart of its mission to ‘build peace, eradicate poverty and drive sustainable 
development’ (UNESCO1). We would argue that education’s current dis(re)pair has been 
brought about by the wrong kind of attention: attention focused on what education should do 
(its instrumental purpose) without regard for what education, itself, actually is (as a kind of 
entity or being in its own right).  
 
While there is certainly merit in attempting to understand education in terms of its purpose, 
this pursuit has become deeply problematic in contemporary times as it is unable to do justice 
to the complexity of human togetherness under conditions of globalization, multiculturalism 
and differential states of technologisation or ‘development’. In societies that are faced with 
many heterogeneous ethical issues, education has therefore been shown to have spectacularly 
failed to redress social and cultural inequality (Giroux 1983, 2005; Apple, 2004); to have 
become a normative tool for social cultural reproduction (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977); and 
to be stifling and toxic to millions who are positioned as being in deficit in relation to dominant 
norms (Battiste, 2004; Andreotti & de Souza, 2008).  
 
Moreover, as Biesta (2009) has argued, while controversy concerning the purposes of 
education has opened a political space for a variety of understandings of education to be 
explored, this has done little to transform the dominant discourses of education. He suggests 
that the move has instead contributed to the dominant discourses of education turning away 
from questions about educational purpose(s) themselves (what they should be) and focusing 
largely on questions about how to effectively accomplish particular educational outcomes. 
This latter focus, so Biesta argues, is problematic in that it allows discussions about 
effectiveness to dominate the educational scene, which means ‘we end up valuing what is 
measured, rather than … engage[ing] in measurement of what we value’ (Biesta, 2009, p. 43). 
For this reason Biesta argues that it is important to keep open a political space in which the 
purposes of education can be continuously be renegotiated.  
 
In this paper we make the point that keeping open a political space in which educational 
purpose can be debated does not mean that the question of educational purpose is necessarily 
a socio-political question. We argue that there is also a structural question concerned with 
how we understand education’s directional impetus. This has much to do with whether we 
understand education as an instrument that is designed to facilitate an external, apriori or 
‘ready-made’ socio-political (normative) purpose, or whether it is possible to also understand 
education as an emergent entity that does not simply serve a purpose, but also brings with it 
the purpose it serves. Importantly, if education is not understood in an instrumental sense, as 
being in the service of some external and ‘ready-made’ socio-political end, a question arises 
as to how its meaning and value might therefore be understood. To address this question we 
start with the assumption that education ‘comes into being,’ as an entity in its own right. For 
us, this implies that education has its own unique aesthetic qualities, like art or music, which 
have the power to elicit emotion and are thus affective (see Turner, 2019, for a fuller discussion 
on the ‘aesthetic’ nature of education). The abovementioned assumption relies heavily on the 
concept of emergence, which challenges many aspects of mechanistic thinking. To make this 
 
1 https://en.unesco.org/themes/education last accessed 25 March 2020 
 3 
argument, a brief delineation of some differences between emergent and mechanistic entities 
and processes is necessary. 
 
Emergence versus mechanism 
The concept of emergence is complex and has a long history and we cannot explore its various 
origins, elaborations and internal conflicts here (see Osberg & Biesta, 2008 and Osberg 2015, 
for an overview). For the purposes of this particular argument, we draw on a line of thinking 
in which emergence can be conceptualised as a ‘coherence principle’ (Scott, 2003) that brings 
into being a novel, ‘higher-level’ entity from the active coordination of diverse ‘lower-level’ 
entities that do not individually ‘need’ such coherence to come into being. An often-used 
example is to be found in the coordinated swooping and wheeling patterns that are brought 
forth by the flocking of starlings. This kind of coordinated flight behaviour is an aesthetic 
phenomenon with no purpose other than itself. It is, in other words, not set up to serve an 
external goal.  
 
The flight behaviour is internally generated by the flock itself, and emerges spontaneously, as 
does an unchoreographed dance or the product of collective improvisation by musicians. It 
happens when the actions of the individual birds, dancers or musicians (the lower-level 
entities, which have their own diverse purposes) become coordinated in a way that produces 
a coherent ‘higher-level’ entity in its own right (the swooping flock, the dance, the music). Such 
an entity can be understood as having a ‘life of its own’ which is distinct from the ‘life’ of the 
entities that cohered to produce it. Moreover, it appears as an entity that invites others to 
engage, in their own way, with the unique qualities of its being. For example, if music serves 
a purpose in the lives of others, this is not because it has been designed to serve the purposes 
of others, but because others find meaning and value in the unique aesthetic qualities of  
‘music’: meaning and value that somehow coheres with their own purposes. 
 
Since the meaning and value of an emergent entity becomes evident only when (not before) it 
manifests, it follows that an emergent entity does not simply ‘serve a purpose’ but also brings 
with it the purpose it serves. Its design and purpose (or value) emerge together. Such entities, 
that ‘come into being’ in this way, cannot be understood in instrumental terms. That is, they 
cannot be understood through reductionist or functionalist analyses. The structure and 
purpose of an emergent entity are inseparable – they manifest in the entity’s affective aesthetic 
qualities – and hence an emergent entity is irreducible. 
 
While a machine does have some superficial similarities with emergent entities – for example 
a clock is made up of parts that interact in a coordinated fashion – there is an important 
difference. The coordinated interaction of a machine’s parts serves an apriori purpose (its 
designated function), and any ability the clock may have to aesthetically affect others is 
additional (and some may say irrelevant) to its purpose. The machine, in other words, is a 
slave: it exists only to fulfill the purposes of its designer/master. An emergent entity, on the 
other hand, has no such ‘natural’ bondage.  
 
It is with this in mind that we wish to challenge the mechanistic assumption that education 
can only be understood in a functional sense, as a passive instrument that exists primarily to 
fulfill the purpose(s) of its designer. We believe education can, and should, also be appreciated 
in an emergentist and affective sense: as something that manifests unique aesthetic qualities. 
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While we draw on the notion of emergence to challenge the dominant instrumental view of 
education, this is not simply because we believe emergence offers us the conceptual tools to 
rethink several key aspects of the educational process as it is currently conceived. Instead we 
use the notion of emergence to present a different way of theorizing education altogether. In 
this regard, we follow Cassirer’s (1944) thinking, that theories are affective entities within 
reality rather than passive representations of reality. That is, theories are entities that can be 
said to have ‘a life of their own’ rather than entities that are permanently in bondage to a 
reality that it is their job to passively represent. This form of theory making – which we refer 
to as ‘emergent theory making’ – is central to the argument we try to make.2 
 
Emergent theory making 
It is well known that in some respects the products of theorising can be conceptualised in 
affective terms, with the ‘best’ theories often being described as ‘elegant’ or ‘beautiful’ by their 
creators and others who appreciate their aesthetic qualities. When this aesthetic is analysed 
(see McAllister, 1996) it appears to be a product of two intertwined features: (i) the intrinsic 
consistency or congruity of the logic of the theory and (ii) its power to achieve a ‘higher’ order 
of truth than other theories. In some ways, this ‘theoretical’ aesthetic (the aesthetic affect a 
theory has on a person) can be related to the abstract concept of symmetry, as articulated in a 
branch of mathematics that goes by the name of ‘group theory’. We elaborate briefly on this 
conceptualisation of symmetry, as it opens the possibility to think about theory in affective 
rather than representational or pragmatic terms. 
 
In group theory, ‘symmetry’ refers to abstract structures (laws and principles) that are 
common to, and hence which unify diverse members of any particular group. For example, 
while scalene, isosceles and equilateral triangles are a group of measurable shapes that 
materially differ from each other, they also conform to certain abstract principles common to 
all triangular shapes (e.g. the sum of two sides of a triangle is always greater than the length 
of the third side). Mathematical forms, such as triangles, lines, planes, fields, rings and vector 
spaces, are all conceptualised as groups endowed with abstract intrinsic operations and 
axioms (or ‘laws’) that are invariant for the group. These invariant laws reflect the ‘symmetry’ 
of the members of the group. Hence the mathematical formulation of symmetry, ‘invariance 
under a wide range of transformations’ (Roche, 1983, p.4), can be thought of as an irreducible, 
symbolic (or ‘abstract’) principle by means of which an invariant can be ‘objectivised’ as a 
truth. In this way mathematics is usually conceived to be a form of representation that reflects 
the ‘deeper’ aspects of reality, i.e. it reflects reality as it ‘really’ is rather than only how it 
‘appears’ to be. 
 
However, as Cassirer (1944) makes clear – and here it becomes possible to reconceive the 
purpose of theory in an affective sense – the mathematical ‘invariant’ that is ‘objectivised’ in 
this manner does not point to some apriori or ‘ready-made’ form (Cassirer, 1944, p. 2). It is an 
abstraction that can be obtained only from active experimentation with the apriori. The 
 
2 Cassirer’s ideas raise important epistemological and ontological questions and, moreover, important 
questions about the relationship between epistemology and ontology. In the next section we touch 
upon these aspects. A full discussion of this lies beyond the scope of this paper. 
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abstract mathematical principle common to all triangular shapes does not, in other words, 
represent any particular triangle. Rather, it brings in to being a new object (albeit an abstract 
one). In this regard, Cassirer is firm about not supporting ‘the assumption that the ‘thing 
character’ of reality is itself objectively given’. In his major work, The Philosophy of Symbolic 
Forms3 he holds that, in relation to language, the identification or ‘objectivisation’ of an 
abstract invariant  
 
‘has as yet nothing to do with attributing an entirely independent reality to the content 
– it is concerned solely with fixing the content for knowledge and characterising it for 
consciousness as something identical with itself and recurrent amid the flux of 
impressions.’ (1955, Vol. 1, Language, p.281, our emphasis)  
 
In relation to mythic thought he holds that the abstract invariant that is ‘fixed’ in this way  
 
‘is not a signification but rather a substantial being and power of its own. It does not 
point to an objective content but sets itself in the place of this content; it becomes a 
kind of Ur-sache [‘cause’ or, literally, ‘original thing’ – tr], a power which intervenes in 
empirical events and their causal concatenation.’ (1955, Vol 2, Mythical Thought, p. 237)  
 
Finally, in relation to knowledge, he holds that the category of ‘thingness’ obtained through 
active experimentation with the apriori 
 
‘. . . exemplifies a particular phase in the view of things, and is an outgrowth of what 
came before. The thing is not the final condition of all knowledge . . . it is a mode of 
having or conceptualising a world, not the presupposition or foundation of our 
understanding a world.’ (1996, Vol 4, The Metaphysics of Symbolic Forms, p. 212, original 
emphasis). 
 
Cassirer shows, in multiple ways, that the ‘thing-like’ quality (symmetry) of an abstract 
invariant, should not be conceived as merely serving the purpose of passively representing 
an already present ‘thing-like’ reality because it actively generates ‘thingness’ through the 
process of abstraction/codification. With Cassirer’s generative formulation, any ‘thingness’ 
that the mathematical concept of symmetry brings forth, is therefore not a closed thingness in 
which A represents A. It is an emergent thingness: an affective entity, with a ‘life of its own’. 
To say this differently, it can be considered to be a phenomenon in its own right: one with 
affective qualities of its own, rather than simply a conceptual or abstract object that represents 
something else. In this sense, the ‘thingness’ of an abstraction has similarities with the 
‘thingness’ of a living entity.4  
 
3 Published in 4 volumes (one posthumously) between 1955 and 1996. 
4 While Cassirer’s (1944) emergentist thinking presents an early radical challenge to representational 
epistemology, his ideas can be contextualised amidst a much broader collection of earlier and later 
challenges to mechanistic causal continuity by authors such as Bergson (1911), Mead (1932), Prigogine 
& Stengers (1984), Deleuze (1991, 2005) and others. Such challenges have directed attention to the non-
mechanical ‘liveliness’ of causal continuity and more recently such thinking has been aligned with 
socio-material (Latour, Stengers) and new-materialist (Coole & Frost, 2010; Dolphijn & van der Tuin, 
2012; Connolly, 2013) approaches. 
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We have highlighted Cassirer’s focus on symbolic forms – their coming into being or 
‘materialisation’ as things with their own unique affective properties – as this enables us to 
define precisely what we mean by ‘emergent theory making’. For the purposes of this 
argument, we now define emergent theory making as mode of theorizing that brings forth 
affective rather than purely functional entities. Such entities do not merely serve a pre-given 
purpose, but offer unique opportunities for engagement and hence bring with them any 
purpose(s) they may come to serve. That said, we now turn to the question of why it is 
necessary to theorise education as an emergent and affective entity, rather than a passive 
instrument that is there to serve a pre-existing function. We do this through a discussion 
regarding the role of the curriculum in current educational discourse. 
 
Education and the curriculum 
In contemporary discourse, ‘education’ is generally understood to name a particular kind of 
functional event: one that demands structured teaching and learning of the ‘right’ things (and 
not the wrong things) to achieve pre-determined, normative ends. This is done via the 
curriculum understood as the way in which educational events are structured. Indeed, the 
structured or curricular teaching and learning of the ‘right’ things can, in many ways, be 
understood as education’s broadest purpose or goal (see Burbules, 2004). That is, education 
can be said to have this curricular structure regardless of which specific ‘right things’ it is 
aiming for, and regardless of whether its curricular focus is ‘strongly’ or ‘weakly’ teleological, 
or justified in ‘transcendent’ or ‘socio-cultural’ terms (ibid). 
 
Because the curriculum is essential in bringing about the specific educational good that is to 
be achieved, whatever that may be, the term ‘curriculum’ is generally implied wherever the term 
‘education’ appears. Indeed many, if not most, educational questions are framed as curricular 
questions (see, e.g. Pinar, Reynolds, Slattery and Taubman, 1995), with the dominant 
discourses of education being concerned with what the ‘right’ things are to be taught and 
learned, who decides this, and how such teaching and learning can be effected. However, 
within dominant framings of education, there are also arguments that education is not simply 
any form of curricular teaching and learning (see. e.g., Osberg and Biesta, 2008). For example, 
liberal educators might argue (contentiously) that education enables people to think for 
themselves and achieve a level of critical autonomy which implies (liberal) education can in 
principle be distinguished from other forms of ‘training’ (e.g. military or vocational training).  
Nevertheless, despite ongoing debate about the alleged differences between ‘education’ and 
‘training’ it cannot be denied that both use curricular mechanisms to effect some form of 
enculturation into pre-defined ways of being (military, elite, vocational, professional, and so 
on). This does not imply, however, that education is fully synonymous with enculturation 
(Osberg and Biesta, 2008). It has been argued, from a sociological perspective, that education 
should rather be understood as a system of enculturing practices that is ideological in nature 
because it is shaped by, and in the interests of, the dominant classes (Bourdieu & Passeron 
1977). Important as this sociological insight has become, it does not in any way free education 
from its primarily curricular framing. Hence in contemporary discourse, there is little 
opportunity to theorise education as anything other than an instrument designed to achieve 
a predetermined socio-political product with the term ‘education’ being used to refer both to 
the educational mechanism (curricular instrument) and to the educational product, as shown 
in Figure 1. From this discussion, it should be clear that (i) the term ‘curriculum’ can very 
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easily be conflated with the term ‘education’ and (ii) it is the curriculum (understood as the 
intentional form and content of the teaching and learning) that is responsible for education’s 
ideological impetus.  
 
Figure 1: Education as curriculum 
 
Importantly, once (the concept of) education becomes identified with (the concept of) 
curriculum there is very little scope to understand education as anything other than a 
normative tool for social and cultural reproduction (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977). In 
contemporary multicultural and globalized societies, this charge has contributed to a lack of 
consensus as to what education actually is or which normative role education should serve. 
In this regard we would suggest that the term ‘education’ currently has no coherent identity 
or meaning.5 As a concept, it has neither intrinsic consistency or congruity nor the power to 
achieve a ‘higher’ order of truth than its ‘lower level’ parts (teaching, learning and 
curriculum). Indeed, it is currently more conceptually accurate to refer directly to various 
externally instituted curricular purposes (socio-political ends), and to the mechanics of the 
teaching and learning processes that facilitate such outcomes, than to their combined action 
(‘education’). Hence it might be argued that education has ‘fallen apart’ or ‘fallen into its 
parts.’ In which case, there is no possibility for education’s expression as an affective emergent 
entity with its own unique qualities: it exists simply to serve externally instituted purposes.  
 
We would argue, however, that education’s current lack of coherence is not cause to give up 
on the concept. This lack might be understood, rather, as a sign that education might be 
rethought in a more elegant fashion. It is to this task that we now turn. In what follows we 
attempt to theorise education in a way that frees it from its bondage to instrumental 
(curricular) ends and reveals it as an end in itself, with its own unique aesthetic qualities6. In 
this regard, we attempt to articulate a non-instrumental and emergentist theory of education: 
one based on the mathematical notion of symmetry as an invariant that generates ‘thingness’.  
 
To theorise education in an emergentist mode, it is necessary to theorise it as an entity – an 
affective thing, in Cassirer’s sense – that arises through the internally coordinated interactions 
of ‘lower-level’ entities that individually do not require such coordination in order to come into being. 
Our hypothesis is that the coordination of such entities generates the phenomenon of 
education as an affective entity with its own aesthetic qualities and that without such co-
ordination education, as an end-in-itself, simply cannot appear.We hypothesise, further, that 
‘lower-level’ contenders for such coordination can be found in three ‘realms’ of human life 
that have long been recognised as objective (albeit intertwined) fields of scholarly enquiry. 
The realms in question are (i) the symbolic realm (or the realm of knowledge),  (ii) the 
individual realm (or the realm of selfhood) and (iii) the political realm (or the realm of the 
common world we share). 
 
5 An additional problem is that the word ‘education’ is rather one-dimensional, whereas other 
languages have a number of different concepts to discuss educational matters – see, for example, in 
German the difference between ‘Bildung’ and ‘Erziehung’ (Biesta 2011; in press). 
6 Importantly, this is not an argument for allowing education to have any end. Hence education’s ends 
cannot be hijacked by individual stakeholders. 
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The notion of education as an entity constituted by by the coordinated interaction of the 
above-mentioned realms of human life is not arbitrary. It has some roots in the tradition of 
paideia which  Jaeger (1944) describes as being central to ancient Greek culture. While in this 
article we ultimately conceptualise education beyond paideia – and in particular beyond the 
idea of paideia as it has been taken up in contemporary theories of Bildung that actively 
promote education as a form of social and cultural reproduction (see Biesta 2018) – we argue 
that (some of) the understandings that generated the idea of paideia provide a ground from 
which it becomes possible to theorise modern education as an affective end-in-itself: one that 
emerges from the coordinated interaction of the abovementioned realms of human life. The 
‘ground’ we refer to concerns the notion of the ‘ideal’. 
 
Paideia and the ideal 
Jaeger (1944) introduces the concept of paideia as a form of education which was not merely 
about perpetuating a pre-existing cultural standard (which can be equated with the training 
of the young in the ways of the old), but about the deliberate pursuit of an improved or ‘ideal’ 
form of humanity. We would like to be clear, however, that while the concept of the ideal 
signified the best or highest form of good, the pursuit of this ideal, within ancient Greek 
culture was not understood as an externally instituted goal, but as an internally generated or 
immanent limit signifying completion or perfection (teleios) as in Aristotle’s teleological 
philosophy.7 For Aristotle (2009, iv), this limit is an internally generated standard that 
delineates a state or function that is unique to the category of beings to which it belongs. This 
is its ‘native excellence’, i.e. the cause of its being and its ultimate purpose. The idea that a pre-
existing category of beings (such as ‘humanity’) may have a ‘native excellence’ or ‘ideal’ 
towards which education can aim, seems concrete enough. However, it becomes evident that 
it is an ideal that demands aiming in several different directions at the same time or, to put it 
more precisely, it demands the active coordination of these different aims. The complexity of the 
notion of native human excellence is partly related to the way in which Aristotle delineates 
‘excellence’ (ἀρετή in Greek, often translated as ‘virtue’ in Latin) as dependent on an 
immanent scale which he also considers to be a ‘rational principle’.  
 
Because he argues that the only activity unique to humans is ‘activity in accordance with 
reason’, Aristotle’s rational principle must itself be subject to this rational principle (immanent 
scale) in order to delineate native human (rational) excellence. This leads Aristotle to 
formulate a complicated hierarchical system of rationalities (e.g. scientific, intuitive, 
deliberative, calculative, and so on) which nevertheless cannot reach their own ideal states of 
excellence or ‘native virtue’ without each other’s help. For example, philosophic wisdom – 
which, for Aristotle represents the ideal state of scientific rationality (‘episteme’) and is the 
most superior form of wisdom – cannot be achieved without the help of an ideal in the 
deliberative category of rationality, which he terms practical wisdom (‘phronesis’). Moreover, 
some ideals (e.g. philosophic wisdom) cannot come into being in the absence of ideal 
(political) forms of togetherness such as those brought forth by the city-state, which is itself 
dependent on forms of ‘right rule’ governed by practical wisdom.  
 




From this necessarily brief elaboration of the complexities of pursuing ‘native human 
excellence’  we hope to have made it clear that paideia’s aspiration to deliver an improved or 
‘ideal’ form of humanity should not be simplistically understood as pointing to a unified 
target. A more rigorous articulation would be to conceptualise paideia’s aspiration as an 
amalgamation of aims pointing in different directions. In aiming towards ‘philosophic 
wisdom,’ which represents that which is best in man, one must strive towards (knowledge of) 
the past and all things eternal and unchanging. But to achieve this, one must also aim towards 
‘practical wisdom,’ which is concerned with what is best for man(kind): hence one must strive 
towards an ideal of care for the future that operates simultaneously (and inseparably) at both 
the individual and political level (care of the self as part of a greater whole which must be 
cared for as a whole).8 Therefore, if paideia can be said to have had ‘an’ aim, this can be read as 
a non-linear aim that sought coherence between ideals in the symbolic, individual and 
political realm. Whether paideia actually aimed for such coherence is largely immaterial. 
What is important is that it was a theory of education that took cognisance of all three realms. 
In this sense the concept of paideia can be understood to have objectivised (or made a thing 
of) the possibility of coherence between the symbolic, individual and political realms and it is 
in this regard – so we will argue – that the idea of paideia opens the possibility for a non-
instrumental (affective, emergent) theory of education. Education, in the non-instrumental 
sense we present, is an immanent phenomenon that emerges only when when the symbolic, 
individual and political realms of human life are actively coordinated from within (see Figure 2).  
In the absence of such immanent coordination, we would argue that education, as an emergent 
phenomenon, simply cannot appear.  
 
Figure 2 
Education as an immanent entity (a higher-level  
phenomenon emerging from a triad of lower-level constituents) 
 
The educational triad in modern education 
In many ways, paeideia’s aspiration to deliver an ideal form of humanity is reflected in the 
normative impetus towards ideal forms of human life that underpins modern education’s 
ideological nature.  This is largely owing to the advent of the European Enlightenment, when 
the idea of an ideal form of humanity regained purchase in the West. The ancient Greek idea 
that an ideal form of humanity necessitated work in the symbolic, individual and political 
realms of human life, provided post-Enlightenment educators with a ready-made foundation 
upon which to build modern notions of education. The fact that modern education is 
substantially different from the educational practices of  Ancient Greece (and continues to 
 
8 Importantly, this reference to ‘care for the future’ is not commensurable with the feminist ‘ethics of 
care’ (e.g. Gilligan, 1982; Noddings, 1986; Tronto 1993; 1996; Held, 2006) which can be shown, without 
exception, to invoke an ends-driven understanding of action that requires knowing in advance what is 
required to act in an ethical manner. Such care is underpinned by an instrumental logic that relies 
absolutely on the idea of rationally informed choice, this being a specific target of critique in political 
theory. Against this understanding of care, Osberg (2010, 2017) has argued that an ideal of care for the 
future that operates simultaneously (and inseparably) at both the individual and political level can be 
aligned with a specifically educational responsibility: one that is unique to education itself, rather than 
being in the service of some pre-existing normative end. 
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change) can partly be attributed to changes in the scientific and philosophical base that we 
use to interpret ideals in the symbolic, individual and political realms.  
 
In early elitist forms of modern education (e.g. as expounded by liberal educators such as von 
Humboldt and Newman and from which, arguably, later variants of modern education have 
grown),  ideals in the three realms of human life were understood in strictly ‘objective’  terms 
such that: 
• Within the symbolic realm, ideal knowledge was that which was a universally true and 
timeless representation of reality (and which could therefore be transmitted intact to 
others), 
• Within the individual realm, the ideal self a self-contained psyche that possessed rational 
autonomy (a state which could be achieved only through the acquisition of ‘ideal’ 
knowledge) and  
• Within the political realm, the ideal was an objectively achievable state of liberty – a 
‘culture’ that is structured around autonomy and reason(a state which only those who 
have reached the prescribed state of selfhood could ‘naturally’ follow). 
 
This interpretation of the three realms of human life has meant that early forms of liberal 
education can be understood as the perpetuation of ideal forms of knowledge (e.g. universal 
truth), selfhood (e.g. rational autonomy) and culture (e.g. liberal political order) through well 
intentioned manipulations of the student’s psyche by the teacher or curriculum (which 
presents and/or represents the ideal knowledge that must be acquired) to achieve the desired 
psycho-social and/or socio-political end (liberal rationalism/humanism). In this liberal 
conceptualisation, education might still be conceived as a higher-level phenomenon 
comprising a triad of lower-level constituents that are interdependent and mutually 
supporting as shown in Figure 2. Hence modern liberal education might be understood as a 
coherent (and some might even say ‘elegant’) theory of education: one which has a clear 
purpose and identity.  
 
Nevertheless, closer scrutiny reveals a hierarchical rather than emergentist relationship 
between liberal education’s three lower-level constituents. Because a particular kind of 
knowledge is required to produce particular kinds of selves which collectively produce a 
particular kind of socio-political order, a hierarchy is established in which the individual and 
political realms of human life are subservient to the symbolic realm. In this regard, liberal 
education should rather be understood as a linear mechanism for social and cultural 
reproduction (see Figure 3): it is a closed system that serves pre-existing normative ideals.9 An 
emergentist theory of education, so we would argue, requires more than simply any form of 
coordination of the symbolic, individual and political realms of human life. It requires an 
immanent form of coordination that is non-hierarchical in nature. That is, the lower-level elements 
of the educational triad must have a mutually supporting or egalitarian relationship. Modern 
 
9 To a large extent this mechanistic, liberal understanding of education is still very dominant in modern 
conceptions of education. Hence the assumption that ‘real’ education (as opposed to vocational 
education, for example, which is deemed to be ‘utilitarian’) is very much connected the goal of rational 
autonomy, freedom and emancipation. For this reason, Usher and Edwards (1994) have described 
modern education as the ‘dutiful child’ of the Enlightenment.  
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liberal education which, like paeideia, relies strongly on ideals in the symbolic, individual and 
political realms of human life, must therefore be ruled out as a contender for an emergentist 
theory of education.  
 
Figure 3: Liberal education as a linear mechanism for social and cultural reproduction 
 
In the last century, further shifts in the scientific and philosophical base that we use to 
interpret the symbolic, individual and political realms of human life have further altered the 
way in which education can be  understood and practiced. For example, the coherence of 
modern liberal education (as an instrument that delivers freedom in the broadest sense of the 
word) has been strongly challenged as theories of knowledge have shifted (in varying 
degrees) to an emergentist mode (see, e.g., Dewey, 1906; Bateson, 1972; Latour and Woolgar, 
1986; Fuller, 2002; von Glasersveld, 1995, amongst others). Since these shifts have put into 
question the assumption that universal truth can be used as a criterion for judging between 
knowledges, important political questions can now be raised about why certain knowledges 
should be legitimated in and through educational curricula while others should not.  
 
In multicultural and differentially technologized societies, this epistemological development 
positions educational goals/norms as a means of perpetuating power inequalities, rather than 
alleviating them. Indeed the loss of universal truth in contemporary epistemological debate is 
precisely what underpins Bourdieu and Passeron’s (1977) understanding of education as a 
tool for social and cultural reproduction. However, we would argue that in Bourdieu and 
Passeron’s sociological understanding of education, only one element of the educational triad 
is theorised in emergentist terms – the one concerned with knowledge and meaning – and that 
it is the lack of emergentist theorising in the other two realms that produces a conception of 
education that is incoherent. To be coherent, an emergentist (and non-instrumental) theory of 
education requires emergentist thinking applied to all three realms of human life.   
 
We argue, furthermore, that the condition of possibility for a coherent emergentist (non-
instrumental, non-linear and immanent) theory of education already exists owing to the 
development of  emergentist forms of theorising that apply to all three lower-level constituents 
of the educational triad. Alongside emergentist theories of knowledge, there also exist 
emergentist theories of selfhood and political life. For example, against notions of the self as 
a rationally autonomous whole, lacking barriers to its action that are in any way external to 
its will, some authors now understand selfhood to emerge in response to that which is ‘not-
self’ (e.g. Arendt, 1958; Butler, 1990; Levinas, 1981, and others) and therefore as something 
that continually ‘comes into presence’ (Biesta 2006) as we encounter the address of what and 
who is other.  
 
Furthermore, ideal forms of collective living (political realm) can no longer be defined by a 
pre-given set of rules for living together (and therefore as a political order that can be mutually 
agreed upon and straightforwardly ‘implemented’ and ‘achieved’) by autonomous, rational 
selves, but as something that must constantly be reworked and which therefore continually 
‘takes place’ as we act and interact with what and who is other, and in the presence of 
disagreement rather than consensus (e.g. Agamben, 1993; Badiou, 2005; Dewey, 1939; Derrida, 
1994; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Rancière, 2010; Young, 1990, and others). Within these 
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perspectives, the individual and the political are imbued with an open-endedness that is quite 
foreign to objectivist understandings of these phenomena. 
 
Nevertheless, despite this condition of possibility for a coherent emergentist theory of 
education, the idea of education as a (linear) curricular instrument has proved to be 
remarkably resilient. While emergentist insights relating to all three components of the 
educational triad have produced many new educational visions, we would argue that, with 
few exceptions (e.g. Osberg & Biesta, 2008; Biesta, 2014), these visions have been structured 
primarily around the idea that education can be properly understood only as a curricular 
instrument that should serve pre-existing (normative) functions. This has meant that 
regardless of the extent of emergentist theorising of all three constituents of the educational 
triad, the focus of attention has come to rest primarily on the normative implications of 
curricular content and structure. Hence a linear hierarchy is again put in place between the 
constituents of the educational triad (as we described earlier, for liberal education) and 
education again becomes curricular and instrumental.  
 
Conclusion 
In this paper we have argued that a non-instrumental (or emergentist) theory of education 
requires emergentist thinking at several levels. First, it requires engagement with the notion 
that a ‘theory’ is not simply an instrument for understanding something else. Following 
Cassirer, we may think of theories also as affective emergent entities in their own right: entities 
which have their own aesthetic qualities, like art or music (or a flock of starlings). Education, 
as an affective theory-phenomenon, only ‘comes into being’ through the actively coordinated 
assembly of ‘its’ lower-level parts: parts that (individually) did not need to cohere in order to 
come into being. Second, it requires an engagement with the idea that (the affective theory-
phenomenon of) education is not simply the (linear) product of  teaching and learning a 
curriculum. It can also be conceived in non-emergentist terms as a non-linear product of lower-
level constituents that (individually) did not need to cohere in order to come into being. The 
lower-level constituents in question being the symbolic, the individual and the political realms 
of human life. Third, it requires that the lower-level constituents of the educational entity 
remain separate from each other in a non-hierarchical (and non-linear) relationship. As soon 
as one member dominates, a hierarchy is introduced which instrumentalises education. 
Fourth, it requires that all the lower-level constituents of the educational entity are theorised 
in emergentist terms. If only one or two are theorised in such terms,  the theory-phenomenon 
of education is incoherent. With the above conditions in place it becomes possible to think of 
education as an affective entity, in its own right, that is, an entity that does not serve a pre-
existing purpose, but brings with it the purpose it serves. 
 
We believe the argument we have presented adds to current thinking about education as an 
end in itself by developing a foundation for understanding education as a coherent, affective 
entity in its own right: one which does not serve a pre-existing (external) purpose, but which 
self-generates the purpose it serves. We would argue, furthermore, that this conception of 
education can be understood as an open-ended form of ‘care for the future’ which Osberg has 
elsewhere described as ‘educational democracy’ (2010) or ‘symbiotic anticipation’ (2017). For 
Osberg, this form of care for the future is concerned not with a ‘good’ future that is already 
decided in advance, which, so it could be argued, it has been the task of education to achieve. 
Rather, it is a mode of engagement with an as yet un-manifest future. After Derrida, we might 
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refer to this as-yet-un-manifest future as an impossible future, that is, a future that as yet 
cannot be foreseen as a possibility (Derrida 1992, p.16). Education, then, is exactly about 
addressing this impossibility, and insisting on the impossible (Biesta 2015; 2017). Although 
we cannot know in advance what ‘good’ such engagement will bring about, we can be certain 
we shall achieve it only if we engage with education as an aesthetic object. 
 
Given the acute political and social dilemmas that normative and instrumental 
understandings of education bring forth in multicultural, and so called ‘democratic’ and 
‘inclusive’ societies, we hope that by providing a foundation from which to theorise education 
as a non-instrumental event (one that has a direction that is not implemented from the 
outside), it may become possible to open a new and more fruitful platform for educational 
discussion than endless political debate about what the instrumental ends of education should 
be. We hope that the groundwork we have presented in this paper provides a meaningful 
starting point for moving beyond such political debate which, by the way, takes place both 
‘outside’ and ‘within’ educational policy, research and practice.  
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